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The number of strikes reported in British industry has been on a downward trend over 
the past two decades, falling in 1998 to their lowest level since records began. This 
may indicate that relations within British industry have improved, however, the same 
period has also witnessed a sharp increase in the number of individual ACAS and 
employment tribunal cases. We discuss possible reasons for the changes in the 
patterns of industrial unrest over time and use individual microdata to examine 
whether the observed decline in strike activity has actually been associated with an 
improvement in perceptions of workplace industrial relations. 
 
 Keywords:  Industrial relations; strikes; individual disputes. 
 
 JEL  Classification:  J52; J53. 
 
 
* Stephen Drinkwater (author for correspondence), Department of Economics, 
University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, United Kingdom, GU2 7XH and IZA, Bonn.  
Tel: +44 (0)1483 689320; Fax: +44 (0)1483 689548; E-mail: 
s.drinkwater@surrey.ac.uk. 
 
** Peter Ingram, Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, 




The British Social Attitudes Survey was originally collected by Social and Community 
Planning Research, London and made available through the UK Data Archive at the 
University of Essex. The CBI Pay Settlements Survey is also available through the UK 
Data Archive and are used here with the permission of the CBI. We would like to thank 
participants at the Economics of Education and Employment Group Annual Conference 
at the University of Leicester, Sarah Brown and Paul Latreille for very helpful 
comments. The help of Jonathan Wadsworth and the suggestions of two anonymous 
referees are also gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 
   1
1. Introduction 
Barometric or leading indicators of workplace unrest offer a guide to the changing 
economic circumstances affecting production. In recent years, the traditional yardstick 
of workplace relations, the strike, has fallen to historically low levels in the United 
Kingdom (UK), suggesting that workplace industrial relations are improving. 
However, other evidence qualifies the extent to which workplace relations in the UK 
are as harmonious as the traditional data would suggest. Therefore, the purpose of this 
paper is to attempt to provide a broader comprehension of the climate of industrial 
relations in the UK.   
 
Industrial disruption, typically through the strike and its threat, has represented the 
essential method of leverage on management. For economists, this has been the 
principal rationale for the study of strike activity. The decline in the traditional 
measure of workplace dissatisfaction may therefore imply that currently there is little 
wrong in UK workplaces. However, as strikes have declined, alternative forms of 
expressing discontent have emerged at the workplace.  Thus in this paper, we attempt 
to identify alternative means through which the disruption of normal working 
arrangements is now being exercised.  These manifestations of discontent are 
potentially of no less interest to economic analysis, insofar that disruption is being 
caused to production process.  In addressing this issue we seek to provide a more 
complete picture of industrial relations since as Sapsford and Turnbull (1994) state 
“strikes are not synonymous with industrial conflict” (p. 249).  
 
Although it may be argued that the disruption caused by alternative forms of 
discontent is likely to be less severe than strikes, there are a number of forms of   2
industrial conflict that could, in theory, be used in the place of strikes. For example, 
Yoder (1940) notes that labour turnover is a possible alternative to striking and indeed 
evidence from the UK suggests that labour turnover has increased over the past two 
decades, while job tenure has declined (Burgess and Rees, 1996; Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2002). However, workplace dissatisfaction is not mentioned by Gregg 
and Wadsworth (2002) as a possible reason for this trend. Sapsford and Turnbull 
(1994) examine whether absenteeism is an alternative form of industrial conflict using 
data from the UK dock industry. They report some evidence that strikes and 
absenteeism are substitutes but also note that these results would not necessarily hold 
for other industries. In any case, recent UK evidence suggests little change in trend 
absenteeism since 1984 (Barmby et al., 1999).  
 
Therefore, rather than focusing on turnover or absenteeism, we will analyse the extent to 
which strikes have been replaced by another form of industrial conflict, namely 
individual expressions of unrest. On the surface, there is support for the view that there 
has been a substitution of individual grievances for strikes since figures for individual 
ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service) cases and employment tribunal 
(ET) cases have shown a dramatic increase since the late 1980s. More generally, our 
paper seeks to address the extent to which British industrial relations can be described as 
more ‘harmonious’ or, more crudely, better than they were two decades ago. In addition 
to analysing the ACAS and ET data, we also use survey data from the Confederation of 
British Industry’s (CBI) series on wage dispute incidence, as well as various data 
provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). We complete our examination of 
this issue by making use of detailed microdata from the British Social Attitudes Survey    3
(BSAS) since this dataset contains a measure of the perceived climate of industrial 
relations between 1983 and 2000.   
  
2. Changing patterns in industrial disputes 
According to the ONS, stoppages of work reached an all time low in 1998. The 
number of stoppages of work was just 166 over the course of the year, the lowest 
figure since records began in 1891 (Davis, 1999).  This was roughly equal to one 
stoppage per 150,000 employees during the year as a whole. The number of working 
days lost, a measure of lost production, was similarly low at just 258,000 days, or a 
total of 5 minutes, 17 seconds per employee: significantly less than absences caused 
by the common cold or other forms of absence. Since 1993 the number of stoppages 
at work has also been low, with less than 250 stoppages in each year.  
 
However we are concerned with the broad trend in industrial disputes over time rather 
than examining individual years. Figure 1 shows the most conventionally used indicator 
of strike activity, the number of working days lost (per thousand workers), for the UK 
between 1979 and 2001. The number of working days lost was highest in the first year of 
the period – when the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ took place. There was another 
peak in strike activity in 1984, although a large part of this figure is accounted for by the 
year-long Miner’s Strike. Working days lost remained relatively high until 1990, after 
which they fell quite rapidly and have remained at a low level since. Davis (2001b) 
summarises the decline in strike behaviour and reports that the average annual number of 
days lost through strikes was 12.9 million during the 1970s, falling to 7.2 million in the 
1980s and to just 660,000 in the 1990s.  
   4
Davis (2001a) reports that similar patterns have been witnessed across OECD countries. 
Therefore, there have been some generic reasons why strikes have fallen but there are 
also some which are specific to the UK. For example, the decline in stoppages at work 
has been attributed to: the role of employment law, (Dorey, 1993; Freeman and Pelletier, 
1991; Metcalf, 1990), the decline in trade union membership (Brook, 2002) and an 
improvement in the nature of employment relations (Metcalf, 1989; Barrell, 1994).  
 
In contrast, Knight and Latreille (2000a) argue that employee-employer conflicts at 
the individual level have received relatively little attention in comparison to collective 
disputes.  In industrial relations, negotiations either result in a settlement or reach an 
impasse. An impasse can involve striking or progressively, as strikes have declined, 
the use of the role of mediation or third party intervention.  Typically this intervention 
has involved either ET cases or ACAS referrals, in which a third party would seek to 
intervene in the process of negotiation to draw the parties to settle.  Despite the 
limited attention that has been paid to these types of disputes, both ET and individual 
ACAS cases have witnessed a rapid increase over the same period in which strikes 
have declined. The growth of third party intervention and the decline in strike activity 
is shown in Figure 2.
1 Whilst the number of collective stoppages has fallen almost 
continuously, the volume of individual cases by workers against their employers has 
risen dramatically between 1987 and 2001, reaching a combined total of over 250,000 
by the end of the period, an increase of more than 300% over the 1983 figure.   
 
                                                           
1 The statistics in the figure have been rescaled to take account of the number of 
employees. For the exact number and a longer time series of each type of dispute as 
well as other UK labour market indicators, see Table A1 in the Appendix.   5
The ET Service is an independent judicial body that advises on disputes relating to 
individual employment rights.  Where application is made to the ET Service, usually 
on grounds of unfair dismissal, discrimination, equal pay and similar related 
complaints, the objective is to provide a relative quick, accessible and informal access 
to justice. ACAS cases are similar to ET cases but emphasize the role of dispute 
resolution through constructive conciliation. As with ET cases, the dispute resolution 
processes offered by ACAS covers a range of conciliation services to help both 
parties reach their own solution. The primary objective of ACAS is to settle any 
dispute between the parties concerned before the dispute proceeds to a tribunal 
(ACAS, 2001). 
 
The evidence presented in Figure 2 is consistent with the Canadian findings of 
Hebdon and Stern (1998). They suggest that there may be “unanticipated changes in 
expressions of industrial conflict when legal changes restrict specific actions such as 
strikes” (p. 204). They also argue that legal restrictions suppressing the collective 
strike are associated with a redirection of industrial conflict into forms other than the 
sanction of the stoppage. Their evidence suggests that movements in more widespread 
manifestations of conflict are related, both theoretically and empirically.  
 
Therefore, the trend towards greater individual action is consistent with Hebdon and 
Stern’s proposition that employee unrest can manifest itself in a variety of different 
forms and that policies directed to restricting a particular type of dispute could prompt 
alternative forms of disruption elsewhere. As Hebdon and Stern argue, “as simple as 
this proposition sounds, it is only rarely recognized in practice” (p. 218). Barbash 
(1979) identifies types of disruption as a collective and individual sanction in the   6
workplace.  Individuals, in the absence of collective forms of unrest, may seek to 
express their discontent by withholding effort, practicing acts of indiscipline and 
tardiness.  All are potentially costly expressions of discontent to productive 
efficiency.   
 
Given the change in the pattern of industrial disputes, Cully et al. (1998) consider that 
employment tribunals are now a more prevalent indicator of overt conflict than 
collective industrial action. These figures give credence to the opinion that there has 
been a general movement in UK workplaces towards greater individualization of the 
employment relation, at the expense of collectivism (Kelly, 1998). This trend is likely 
to have been further enhanced by changes in the employment contract. Brown et al. 
(2000) trace the increase in individualization back to the 1963 Contracts of 
Employment Act, which was later extended by the European Council Directive 
91/553/EEC. However, they note that individual employment rights have been 
particularly enhanced by the substantial legislation introduced after the new Labour 
government came to power in 1997. For example, by the end of 1999, the Working 
Time Directive, the National Minimum Wage, the European Works Council Directive 
and the Employment Relations Act had been introduced. Using the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS), Brown et al. (2000) report that the influence of 
trade unions on many aspects of the employment contract had diminished quite 
considerably over time. They argue that union influence has narrowed and become 
more consultative at workplaces where they are still recognized, whilst in general, 
employment contracts have typically become both more formalized and standardized. 
Knight and Latreille (2000a) further suggest that the volume of tribunal cases may 
continue to rise with the introduction of the 1999 Employment Relations Act, which   7
reduces the qualifying period for unfair dismissal to one year and raises the upper 
limit on compensation payments to £50,000.  
 
There are a number of possible explanations why this transformation has taken place. 
Firstly, there has been an increase in the cost of organising strikes to employees given 
the decline in unionisation and the new legislative hurdles that have been imposed on 
striking groups and trade unions (Freeman and Pelletier, 1991). This could be 
described as an increased transaction cost to collective action. Secondly, the rate of 
return to striking, on average, is not significant.  Employees realise this and where the 
returns to an activity are poor, individuals tend to do it less often. Table 1 reports 
evidence from the CBI Pay Settlements Survey, which extends the work of Metcalf, 
Wadsworth and Ingram (1993) up to 2000.  This suggests that the average return to 
strike action has typically been small since 1989. Finally, there has been an increased 
opportunity cost to striking as shown in the average foregone wage.  ONS data show 
that real wage growth since 1980 has been reasonably buoyant for the average 
employee, implying a reduction in the causes of workplace discontent, possibly 
suggesting a more harmonious environment at the workplace (Metcalf, 1989). 
 
  3. Strikes and other forms of unrest: complements or substitutes? 
As already discussed, given that prosecuting a strike has become increasingly 
‘expensive’, other potentially less ‘costly’ forms of industrial disruption could replace 
stoppages as substitute forms of disruption. Therefore in addition to highlighting the 
apparent switch from collective to individual action, it is also important to establish 
whether or not strikes have been replaced by other forms of collective action. In the past, 
research has focused on the potential cathartic aspect of strikes. In this view, strikes   8
provide a mechanism through which the ‘collective voice’ of a dispute can assist parties 
in rectifying faults at the workplace (Godard, 1992). The decline in strikes and the 
progressive reduction in unionised workplaces has perhaps led to a growth in alternative 
means of addressing workplace grievances and other issues. Previous research  has 
shown that strike incidence and disruptions such as work to rules, go slows and overtime 
bans, which potentially involve lower costs to workers through foregone wages have 
been complementary forms of unrest (Edwards, 1981; Cahill and Ingram, 1987; 
Millward et al., 1992).  In effect, strikes and other forms of unrest have fallen and risen 
together.  So while the number of stoppages has declined since the late 1970s, so too 
have all types of collective unrest.  This complementary pattern of decline in collective 
action might be explained by the fact that the legal impediments to collective action 
short of a strike, such as pre action ballots, also apply to these alternative types of 
disruption.  
 
Table 2 reports the correlation between strikes and other types of collective disruption 
(overtime bans, go slows and other actions) using the CBI Pay Settlements Survey. The 
correlation coefficients in the table show the pronounced positive association between 
different types of collective industrial disruption over the period 1979 to 2000. Strike 
incidence and other types of industrial action have all been closely correlated with each 
other, whether monitored annually or monthly, indicating that alternative forms of 
collective disruption have fallen together as strikes have declined. Other recent evidence 
also appears to endorse the decline in all forms of collective unrest (Cully et al., 1999).   
 
However, as indicated in the previous section, individual as opposed to collective 
measures of unrest or dissatisfaction qualify the extent of the improvement in industrial   9
relations.  While collective action has risen and fallen together, individual disruption, 
may occur as a substitute form of expressing a grievance in circumstances where the 
relative cost of collective action has restricted its use. Under these conditions, individuals 
may begin to switch to alternative means of expressing their grievances at the workplace 
as witnessed by the increase in the number of individual cases of discontent. In addition, 
the decline in union membership and consequent growth in non-union workplaces are 
likely to have reinforced this trend.  The cost to individual employees of embarking on 
these substitute forms of unrest can be relatively trivial and where successful, potentially 
lucrative.  According to data collected by the TUC in 1999, the average compensation 
pay out from union backed personal injury claims was £6,150.  Although many of these 
claims are not comparable to strike activity, in either cause or outcome they are 
reflective of the potential benefits of pressing an individual claim against an employer.  
Thus the potential benefit of pursuing an ET or individual ACAS case against an 
employer appears to far outweigh the costs of embarking on the action.   
 
4. Survey evidence on workplace industrial relations  
What evidence, in addition to the decline in strike activity, is there that industrial 
relations at Britain’s workplaces have improved since the early 1980s? Given the 
increased volume of ET and individual cases at ACAS, the issue of workplace industrial 
relations requires further investigation. We therefore use micro-data from 1983 to 2000 
to examine whether industrial relations have changed over the period.  The main dataset 
that we will analyse, the BSAS, is a representative sample of British adults who are 
primarily asked a series of questions regarding their attitudes about a range of social 
issues.
2 In addition, the survey also collects information on the respondents’ socio-
                                                           
2 See Jowell et al. (1984) for a detailed description of the survey.   10
economic, demographic and workplace characteristics. The survey has been conducted 
annually since 1983, except for 1988 and 1992 when no surveys took place. The BSAS 
has previously used for analysing industrial relations by Brown and Sessions (2000) and 
Bryson (1999, 2001). The sample size has varied over time, peaking in 1996 at 3620 
respondents, whilst only 1355 individuals were interviewed in the following year. The 
numbers answering the question regarding perceptions of industrial relations at the 
workplace therefore varies accordingly, with sample sizes of 1516 and 540 in these two 
years respectively. 
 
The WERS also asks a question on the climate of industrial relations at the workplace. In 
the most recent survey, conducted in 1998, these questions were asked to management, 
union representatives and non-managerial employees. However, the WERS and its 
predecessor, the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS), have been undertaken 
far less frequently than the annual BSAS, which makes it more difficult to establish any 
trends over time.
3 Furthermore, until the latest survey, the question was only asked to 
management rather than to all employees and this may give a distorted picture of 
industrial relations. However, given that the WERS provides the most important and 
complete snapshot of industrial relations in the UK, it is useful to discuss the results 
from the two sources.  
 
Cully et al. (1999) using WERS data find that management have a far more favourable 
view of industrial relations than either union representatives or non-managerial 
                                                           
3 Only four WIRS/WERS have taken place since 1980.    11
employees.
4 To illustrate this, 90% (2%) of managers thought industrial relations to be 
either very good (poor) or good (poor) compared with 57% (21%) of union 
representatives and 51% (21%) of employees. Only in around 30% of the workplaces did 
the three parties agree on the climate of industrial relations in their workplace. The 
pattern of management responses was similar to that in previous surveys. 
 
The specific question we use from the BSAS in this paper, from which information in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 and Figure 3 are derived is: In general how would you describe 
relations between management and other employees at your workplace: Very good, 
quite good, not very good or not good at all? The responses to this question were re-
coded for use in the following way: not good at all was recoded as 1, not very good as 2, 
quite good as 3 and very good as 4.
5 All our figures and tables report weighted data. 
Figure 3 indicates that reported industrial relations in the workplace were highest (or 
better) at the start of the period, but then fell quite markedly between 1990 and 1994 
before recovering somewhat towards the end of the period. Therefore, as opposed to 
what the data on strikes would indicate, the survey data analysed here do not imply that 
this reduction has been associated with an improvement in industrial relations. This is 
also consistent with the findings of Gallie et al. (2001) who report that there was not a 
significant increase in employees’ commitment to their organizations between 1992 and 
1997. 
                                                           
4 The results are based on the views of 1927 managers, 813 union representatives and 
22,604 employees. 
5 A direct comparison with the WERS is therefore not possible since the categories are 
different as respondents in the WERS were asked to assess the climate of industrial 
relations on a 5-point scale ranging from very poor to very good.   12
In order to control for other factors that may have affected workplace industrial relations, 
such as the composition of the workforce and changes in union coverage, an 
econometric model is estimated. As a consequence, not only will we be able to 
determine whether industrial relations have improved after holding other factors constant 
but we can also observe which other factors influence an individual’s perception of 
industrial relations at their workplace. Given that the responses to the industrial relations 
question are categorical and ordered, we estimate an ordered probit model.  
 
Results for three sets of explanatory variables are reported in Table 3: individual 
characteristics, job related characteristics and time effects.
6 By including personal and 
workplace characteristics in the models, we can then examine the time dummies and 
time trend to determine what has happened to workplace industrial relations after 
controlling for other co-variates. The definitions of the dummy variables e.g. social class 
and industry were chosen in an attempt to maintain consistency over time. We estimate 
three specifications of the model since the sector in which the individual works and 
workplace size were not asked in each survey and we replace the time dummies with a 
time trend in the third specification. 
 
It can be seen from Table 3 that there are some interesting differences in terms of 
personal characteristics. Females report better industrial relations at their workplaces 
than males and married individuals also perceive industrial relations to be better in 
comparison to their single counterparts. Industrial relations are decreasing with age 
                                                           
6 Cully et al. (1999) examine the relationship between the industrial relations climate 
and variables such as the commitment of management and employees, which are not 
available in the BSAS.   13
but the coefficient on the squared term is positive. Each of the three ethnic minority 
groups report worse industrial relations at their workplaces compared to whites, 
although this difference is only significant for Blacks. 
 
In terms of the job related characteristics, the evidence from the BSAS clearly implies 
that union presence at the workplace is associated with poorer reported industrial 
relations.
7 However, there is some debate about the influence of unions on industrial 
relations and job satisfaction. It could be argued that unions are the cause of 
antagonism with management but union members are also more likely to report 
poorer industrial relations and job satisfaction because of the exit-voice mechanism 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Bender and Sloane (1998) examine this issue and find 
that by including a measure of industrial relations in their job satisfaction regressions 
the reported differences between union members and non-members are genuine.
8 
They conclude that the relative dissatisfaction of union members is the result of poor 
industrial relations or by unions forming where satisfaction is already low.  There is 
also some industrial and regional variation, with construction and service sector 
workers most likely to report good industrial relations and workplace harmony being 
greatest in Wales and worst in the West Midlands, Scotland and the North West.  
 
Social class has an influence on the perceptions of workplace industrial relations but 
its effect is different when the public sector dummy and workplace size are included 
                                                           
7 Bryson (1999) examines this relationship in some detail. 
8 It makes very little difference as to how union influence is measured because an 
almost identical coefficient is obtained if the union status of the individual is included 
in the ordered probit rather than the presence of unions at the workplace.     14
in specification 2. Compared to professional workers, those from an intermediate 
social class reported significantly better industrial relations at their workplace in the 
first specification, whereas the signs attached to the skilled, semi skilled and unskilled 
dummies are both significant and negative in specification 2.  Workplace size has a 
very significant impact on reported employment relations with larger workplaces 
being far less harmonious.
9  
 
Public sector workplaces are also characterised by poorer industrial relations. In 
contrast, other UK studies have found that public sector workers tend to report higher 
levels of job satisfaction. For example, Heywood et al. (2002) estimate that public 
sector workers have significantly higher job satisfaction using the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS).  However, the difference between public and private sector 
workers is no longer significant after individual fixed effects are controlled for. They 
suggest that their findings are consistent with workers sorting themselves into the 
public sector, in the sense that those who are more easily satisfied are drawn into 
public sector jobs. The sorting explanation may also account for why seemingly more 
satisfied public sector workers report that industrial relations are poorer at their 
                                                           
9 There exists a long established literature on the effect of workplace size on industrial 
relations. For example, Prais (1978) argues that even if strikes are generated by a 
random process, the increased number of links between individuals in larger plants, 
and thus the number of potential points of conflict, means that strikes are observed 
more frequently in such workplaces. Marginson (1984) analyses whether plant and 
company size have differential effects on workplace industrial relations. He finds that 
company size has a separate and distinct effect on both strike frequency and duration.    15
workplaces. Furthermore, since the BSAS does not collect repeated information on the 
same individuals, we are unable to control for unobserved fixed effects. 
 
Of most interest to our paper are the coefficients on the year dummies as these isolate 
the temporal changes in industrial relations after controlling for personal and job 
related characteristics. We find that the pattern of industrial relations shown in Figure 
3 is not altered greatly by controlling for individual and workplace differences in the 
ordered probit, with relations between workers and management being best between 
1983 and 1985 and worst during the mid to late 1990s. In specification 3, the year 
dummies are replaced with a time trend and its square because of the apparent non-
linearities in industrial relations shown in Figure 3. As expected, the time trend is  
negative and highly significant, suggesting that reported industrial relations have been 
on a downward trend over the period.  However, further evidence of the u-shaped 
relationship between industrial relations and time is provided by the positive and 
significant coefficient attached to the time trend squared, indicating that industrial 
relations improved towards the end of the period relative to earlier in the 1990s.  
 
Further information on changes in the perception of workplace industrial relations 
over time can be found in Table 4, which reports estimates of the time trend and time 
trend squared for different subgroups of the sample. The table shows that similar 
changes in the perception of workplace industrial relations have been reported by 
males and females, workers at union and non-union workplaces and public and 
private sector workers, whilst there are some differences by industry. In particular, it 
can be seen that for each of the subgroups there is a negative coefficient on the time 
trend, which is of similar magnitude and significant at the 10% level or better, apart   16
from workers employed in manufacturing. Similarly, a positive and significant 
coefficient on the time trend squared is obtained for each of the subgroups apart from 
manufacturing and public sector workers. 
 
The table also reports the point at which industrial relations are at a minimum for each 
of the subgroups.
10 If an ordered probit model is estimated for the entire sample 
without any controls other than the trend and its square then reported industrial 
relations reach their minimum in 1994-5, which is consistent with the information 
presented in Figure 3. However, when personal and job characteristics are added, 
reported industrial relations do not reach a minimum until 1996-7. This can be 
explained by greater proportion of the sample possessing characteristics associated 
with improved industrial relations later on in the period, such as a higher proportion 
of females and workers from smaller, non-manufacturing and non-unionised 
workplaces. Similarly, for each of the subgroups in the table, reported industrial 
relations do not reach a minimum until quite late in the period. This is especially true 
for public sector and manufacturing workers.
11 In contrast, employees in unionised 
workplaces reported that their industrial relations reached a minimum in 1995-6.    
                                                           
10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting we do this. The formula 
used to calculate the minimum point is 1982 ) 2 | (| 2 +
t t β β , where  | | t β is the  absolue 
value of the coefficient attached to the trend and  2 t β is the coefficient attached to the 
trend-squared. 1982 is added given that it is the year before the sample period begins 
and the linear time trend starts at 1.   
11 For manufacturing workers, the coefficients attached to the trend and its square are 
both negative implying that perceived industrial relations are in continuous decline   17
 
The broad trends reported in Table 3 and the information presented in Table 4   
indicates that industrial relations improved towards the end of the period. It is also 
interesting to note that this effect is most evident in those workplaces which have 
union representation.  A likely explanation for this finding is that union leaders in 
Britain became more committed to ‘social partnerships’ between unions, employers 
and workers in the late 1990s (Kelly, 2004). Crouch (2000) also argues that British 
unions had become more adaptable to new challenges and were more willing to 
change by the end of the 1990s. On the other hand, the continued decline in the 
British manufacturing industry provides a likely explanation for why such an 
improvement was not observed in this sector.    
 
The growth in performance related pay (PRP) schemes and greater employee 
involvement might also have changed employment relations over time. However we 
have chosen not to add these variables to the regressions because of the potential 
endogeniety between these variables, since workplaces where relations are less than 
harmonious are unlikely to introduce such schemes and because the PRP questions 
were only asked in four of the surveys. Therefore, Table 5 reports the cross-tabulation 
of the different types of PRP schemes and reported workplace industrial relations.
12  
                                                                                                                                                                      
after controlling for other characteristics. The turning point for private sector workers 
is also relatively late (1997-8). Thus when the sector of employment is controlled for, 
the turning point for the whole sample is 1997-8. This can be explained by there being 
three fewer years of data when controls for sector of employment are added.  
12 A similar table can be found in Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), who use WIRS 
1984 data.   18
 
As can be seen from Table 5, of the organisations that operate a single incentive pay 
scheme, those with productivity bonuses and share ownership or options schemes 
actually have lower reported industrial relations compared with those organisations 
without any incentive pay schemes.  Industrial relations are better in those 
organisations which operate an annual bonus or profit sharing scheme, although the 
latter difference is not significant. There is some variation in perceived industrial 
relations within organisations that operate more than one incentive pay schemes. For 
example, those with three such schemes experience a considerable improvement in 
their industrial relations, whereas there is no significant difference between 
organisations which have two or four incentive pay schemes and those organisations 
which do not operate them at all. Therefore the BSAS data suggest that there is no 
clear relationship either between the presence or number of incentive pay schemes 
and industrial relations at the workplace.
13 Furthermore, Booth and Francesconi 
(2000) examine the possibility that union coverage and PRP are to some extent 
                                                           
13 Results from an ordered probit model estimated for the four years that featured the 
PRP questions are generally similar to those reported in Table 5. For example, 
employees in workplaces with annual bonuses or with three PRP schemes continued 
to report significantly better industrial relations. However, there are also some 
differences after controlling for other covariates since employees in workplaces with 
two PRP schemes now had significantly better industrial relations and employees in 
workplaces operating productivity bonus or share ownership/options schemes no 
longer had significantly poorer industrial relations. Full details of the results are 
available from the authors on request.   19
substitutes for one another but do not find a great deal of support for this hypothesis 
using BHPS data. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined whether the decline in strike activity in the UK over the past 
two decades has been associated with an improvement in industrial relations. To 
achieve this, two main issues have been examined. Firstly, whether employees are 
articulating grievances at work through alternative means and secondly, by analysing 
workers’ perceptions of their relations with management over time. In particular, we 
sought to establish whether the reduction in collective voice through declining union 
representation has forced UK workers to resort to individual means of communicating 
their discontent. The evidence we have presented suggests that a decline in collective 
forms of unrest has been counter-balanced by an increase individual manifestations of 
workplace disruption. This individual ‘action’, although diverse in its causes, can 
prove expensive and disruptive to a firm’s production. Furthermore, with little 
evidence of an improving climate of industrial relations from the BSAS, the reduction 
in strike activity may therefore prove an erroneous measure of harmony at the British 
workplace. 
 
Our paper has also provided evidence on the declining returns to collective wage 
stoppages, as well as finding little evidence that unions have shifted from striking to 
engaging in other forms of workplace unrest. In fact, we find that different types of 
collective action appear to have moved as complements to each other.  Individual 
disruption, however, appears to have emerged as a substitute means articulating 
discontent in the workplace, as collective forms of expressing discontent have proved   20
both difficult and expensive to organise. Denied the cathartic aspect of collective 
disputes, individual discontent may have increased in reaction. Therefore despite the 
reduction in strikes, our paper has raised doubts over whether there has been an 
improvement in British industrial relations, a view that is consistent with evidence 
from the BSAS.  
 
There are a number of issues that are discussed in this paper that warrant further 
investigation. Better information on the costs and benefits of embarking on ET and 
ACAS cases would enable a more direct comparison with the average costs and 
expected gains from strikes.  This would enable researchers to examine two possibilities.  
First, the extent to which the decline in collective action has occurred for reasons of cost.  
Second, to explore whether individual disruption has occurred as a substitute form of 
expressing a grievance in conditions where the relative cost of collective action has 
restricted its use. Knight and Latreille (2000b) and Tremlett and Banerji (1994) have 
began to address this issue but more research needs to be undertaken before any clear 
conclusions can be reached. Finally, the evidence from the BSAS suggests that industrial 
relations declined in the UK between the early 1980s and late 1990s but appear to have 
recovered since. To some extent, this improvement can be explained by the changing 
outlook and strategies adopted trade unions but further research is needed to shed more 
light on this issue.    21
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Table 1 
 
Pay settlements with and without strikes in manufacturing: 1979-2000  
 
Mean real pay change (%) 
Settlements with a 
strike 
Settlements 






1 2 3 
1979-80 -0.104  -2.839  2.734  (0.000) 
1980-81 -4.189  -4.114  -0.075  (0.896) 
1981-82 -3.835  -3.550  -0.286  (0.580) 
1982-83 1.007  0.873  0.134  (0.777) 
1983-84 1.526  0.931  0.595  (0.045) 
1984-85 1.735  0.598  1.137  (0.029) 
1985-86 1.722  1.907  -0.186  (0.670) 
1986-87 1.599  1.313  0.286  (0.289) 
1987-88 2.598  1.978  0.619  (0.041) 
1988-89 0.882  -0.141  1.023  (0.048) 
1989-90 0.503  0.085  0.418  (0.537) 
1990-91 _  -0.626  _ 
1991-92  _ 0.157 _ 
1992-93  _ 0.813 _ 
1993-94  _ 0.405 _ 
1994-95 1.381  0.063  1.318  (0.006) 
1995-96  _ 0.799 _ 
1996-97  _ 0.505 _ 
1997-98  _  -0.051  _ 
1998-99 -0.147  0.726  -0.873  (0.135) 
1999-2000 0.167  0.339  -0.172  (0.779) 
1979-84 -0.819  -1.710  0.891  (0.002) 
1984-89 1.860  1.140  0.720  (0.000) 
1989-94 0.472  0.177  0.295  (0.561) 
1994-2000 0.681  0.396  0.286  (0.292) 
1979-2000 0.386  -0.045  0.432  (0.004) 
 
Notes: 
1. No information is presented for years when there were less than 5 observations 
which had a settlement with a strike, as denoted by _. 
2.  p-values in parentheses. 
 
Sources: 
CBI Pay Settlements Survey. 
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Table 2 
 
Correlation coefficients between types of collective industrial action in 
manufacturing: 1979-2000 
 
By pay year 
  Strikes  Overtime bans  Other types of action  Go slows 
Strikes 1.000       
Overtime bans  0.926*  1.000     
Other types of action  0.856*  0.769*  1.000   
Go slows  0.936*  0.964*  0.849*  1.000 
 
By month 
  Strikes  Overtime bans  Other types of action  Go slows 
Strikes 1.000       
Overtime bans  0.678*  1.000     
Other types of action  0.270*  0.380*  1.000   
Go slows  0.614*  0.736*  0.361*  1.000 
 
Notes: 
1.  Number of observations = 29,309. 
2.  * denotes significance at the 1% level.  
3.  Results relate to correlation coefficients between types of industrial action pursued    
      in support of a pay claim. 
 
Source:  
CBI Pay Settlements Survey. 
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Table 3 
 
Ordered probit estimates of workplace industrial relations 
 
    Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
  Mean  Coef. t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. 
Individual characteristics           
Female 0.487  0.190  10.900  0.168  8.377  0.190  10.910 
Age   38.829  -0.024  5.131  -0.023  4.334  -0.024  5.180 
Age  squared/100  16.539  0.037  6.660 0.036 5.480 0.038 6.690 
Married  0.644  0.040  2.038 0.045 1.951 0.042 2.103 
South Asian  0.018  -0.060  0.960  -0.045  0.630  -0.066  1.052 
Black 0.018  -0.208  3.360  -0.198  2.692  -0.213  3.441 
Other ethnic group  0.009  -0.070  0.799  0.030  0.311  -0.065  0.748 
Job related characteristics           
Union at workplace  0.564  -0.413  24.162  -0.205  8.568  -0.412  24.099 
Primary industry   0.030  -0.151  3.107  -0.133  2.450  -0.148  3.034 
Manufacturing industry  0.231  -0.194  9.431  -0.141  5.455  -0.192  9.339 
Construction  industry  0.045  0.142  3.451 0.103 2.259 0.149 3.612 
Scotland 0.085  -0.115  2.483  -0.116  2.207  -0.120  2.595 
Northern 0.057  -0.016  0.326  -0.011  0.196  -0.015  0.297 
North West  0.102  -0.099  2.203  -0.112  2.213  -0.102  2.276 
Yorkshire & Humberside  0.093  -0.048  1.047  -0.053  1.033  -0.051  1.107 
West Midlands  0.097  -0.122  2.680  -0.132  2.574  -0.125  2.747 
East Midlands  0.073  -0.072  1.515  -0.073  1.340  -0.078  1.642 
East Anglia  0.041  -0.058  1.051  -0.061  0.991  -0.057  1.043 
South West  0.083  -0.023  0.486  -0.065  1.217  -0.025  0.542 
South East  0.205  -0.089  2.152  -0.071  1.507  -0.092  2.230 
London 0.114  -0.124  2.760  -0.094  1.818  -0.129  2.856 
Intermediate social class  0.280  0.113  2.871  0.014  0.303  0.107  2.734 
Skilled 0.470  -0.022  0.574  -0.178  4.029  -0.027  0.698 
Semi-skilled 0.154  -0.039  0.931  -0.205  4.230  -0.043  1.031 
Unskilled 0.045  -0.024  0.444  -0.173  2.798  -0.030  0.553 
Public Sector  0.326  _  _  -0.131  5.120  _  _ 
Workplace size: 10-24  0.159  _  _  -0.214  6.076  _  _ 
Workplace size: 25-99  0.262  _  _  -0.418  12.965  _  _ 
Workplace size: 100-499   0.247  _  _  -0.598  17.713  _  _ 
Workplace size: 500 or more   0.181  _  _  -0.645  17.527  _  _   29
Table 3 (Continued) 
Time effects            
1984 0.040  -0.051  0.884  *  *  _  _ 
1985  0.044  -0.020 0.345 0.044 0.752  _  _ 
1986 0.079  -0.126  2.525  -0.096  1.869  _  _ 
1987 0.070  -0.097  1.887  -0.038  0.713  _  _ 
1989 0.074  -0.163  3.232  -0.094  1.809  _  _ 
1990 0.056  -0.066  1.223  -0.013  0.244  _  _ 
1991 0.018  -0.187  2.547  -0.182  2.426  _  _ 
1993 0.064  -0.241  4.633  -0.180  3.364  _  _ 
1994 0.080  -0.364  7.293  _  _  _  _ 
1995 0.077  -0.332  6.613  _  _  _  _ 
1996 0.086  -0.314  6.352  -0.247  4.844  _  _ 
1997 0.030  -0.207  3.301  -0.157  2.449  _  _ 
1998 0.079  -0.346  6.914  -0.260  5.045  _  _ 
1999 0.078  -0.183  3.636  -0.118  2.271  _  _ 
2000 0.085  -0.248  5.002  -0.182  3.546  _  _ 
Trend  _  _  _ _ _  -0.051  7.200 
Trend  squared  _  _  _ _ _  0.002  5.063 
Log likelihood  _  -20569  -15448  -20596 
N 18375  18375  14126  18375 
 
Notes:  
1.  Table reports weighted estimates. Mean relates to the sample average for each 
explanatory variable used in the ordered probit.   
2.  No questions were asked on type of organisation in 1983, 1994 or 1995 and on 
workplace size in 1983.  
3.  The default individual is a single (0.356), white (0.956), male (0.513), 
professional (0.051), non-unionised (0.436), private sector worker (0.674) in a 
service sector organization (0.694) with fewer than 10 employees (0.151), living 
in Wales (0.049) in 1983 (0.041). Given the absence of information on type of 
organization in 1983, the default year is 1984 for specification 2 - signified by * in 
the appropriate cell. Means for each of the default categories are shown in 
parentheses.  
4.  Means for sector and workplace size are based on the sample used in specification 
2, whereas all other means relate to specification 1.  
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Table 4 
 
Ordered probit estimates of workplace industrial relations, by subgroup 
 
Sector Workplace  status  Industry  Gender   
Public Private  Unionised  Non-unionised  Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Male  Female 
































Turning point  1998-9  1997-8  1995-6  1997-8  _  1995-6  1996-7  1996-7 
N 4603  9523  10370  8005  4244  14131  9424  8951 
 
Notes: 
1.  t-statistics in parentheses. 
2.  Estimates are obtained using specification 3, apart from the estimates for sector, which are obtained using Specification 2, with the time 
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Table 5 
 
Workplace industrial relations by type of incentive pay at organisation 
 
Workplace industrial relations   















None 5.23  13.97  47.88  32.91  _  _  2842 
Productivity linked 
bonus   6.02 17.44  51.61  24.94  -0.131  0.001  559 
Annual bonus   5.40  9.90  40.29  44.40  0.150  0.000  436 
Share ownership 
or share option  7.39 17.39  51.78  23.44  -0.175  0.001  243 
Profit sharing   6.42  12.99  45.25  35.35  0.018  0.775  204 
Other    5.46  15.08  42.42  37.04  0.059  0.679  39 
Two schemes  3.13  12.50  54.13  30.25  0.019  0.655  411 
Three schemes  2.68  5.86  47.16  44.30  0.219  0.004  135 
Four schemes  0.00  7.96  78.39  13.65  -0.037  0.787  33 
Total 5.21  13.76  48.38  32.65  _  _  4902 
 
Notes:  
1.  Table uses pooled weighted data from 1985, 1987, 1993 and 1996 – the years 
when questions on incentive pay were asked in the BSAS. 
 
2.  Mean diff. is the difference in the average response to the industrial relations 
question given by workers in workplaces which operate each type of incentive pay 
scheme relative to the average response given by employees with no incentive pay 
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Stoppages Individual ACAS cases ET Cases
Sources: ONS, ACAS and the ET Service   34
Figure 3 

























                   


























1983 1,364  42,943  39,939  22.3  11.7  456 
1984 1,221  42,723  39,824  22.5  11.3  432 
1985 903  42,887    37,910  22.6  11.1  400 
1986 1,074  51,421  39,404  22.6  10.8  391 
1987 1,016  40,817  34,233  22.9  10.6  374 
1988 781  44,443  29,317  23.6  10.5  344 
1989 701  48,817  31,913  24.0  10.4  326 
1990 630  52,071  35,826  24.2  10.0  319 
1991 369  60,605  41,768  23.5  9.8  306 
1992 253  72,166  67,325  23.0  9.5  291 
1993 211  75,181  69,612  22.9  8.9  305 
1994 205  79,332  67,325  23.0  8.7  297 
1995 235  91,568  73,472  23.3  8.2  273 
1996 244  100,399  *  23.7  8.0  260 
1997 216  106,912  74,614  24.2  7.9  255 
1998 166  113,000  74,006  24.7  7.8  252 
1999 205  164,525  83,409  25.2  7.9  238 
2000 212  167,186  92,938  25.6  7.9  237 
2001 194  165,093  97,386  25.9  7.8  226 
 
Notes:   




Strikes and Employee jobs: ONS. 
 
ACAS cases: ACAS Annual Report, Working Together, (conciliation cases received) 
Table 12, July 2002. 
 
Employment tribunal statistics: Annual Report and Accounts of the Employment 
Tribunal Service 2001-2002, ‘OUTCOMES’, Table 2, p. 22, July 2002. 
 
Trade union statistics: Certification Officer Annual Reports. 
 
  